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We present data on debt accumulation in Australia and the United States, and tentative 
data on Romania, to pose the question of whether Romania might experience a credit 
crunch as a result of the US subprime financial crisis. We develop a model of a credit 
crunch in a pure credit economy with endogenous money creation to show how 
changes in bank lending practices and borrower repayment behaviour can bring about 
an economic decline. 
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Quo Vadis, Economics? 
At the beginning of the last decade, the global economy faced a relative growth, 
prolonged by the increasing magic of capital flows and inadequate appreciation of risks 
and future activities in the markets. The lack of vision in deciding standards and the 
approach of a risky behaviour in the market are now, more and more, perceived as 
misunderstandings of economic storms signals. In some developed countries the 
policy-developers and strategy experts did not comprehend, in due time, and at right 
standards, neither the risks of the moment - insufficiently matched and inter-
coordinated within the macroeconomic policies, nor the consequences of building up in 
volatile financial markets.    
Thus, sophisticated financial innovations managed to excessive leverage in creating 
vulnerabilities bringing together inadequate structural reforms, unsustainable interna-
tional macroeconomic outcomes and severe market disruption.  
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Figure 1 
USA Asset Bubbles were obvious before they burst 
 
 
One good example illustrating these aspects is given by the housing industry of which 
70% increase in prices during the first years of this last decade was followed by a 
major decline until nowadays. It was an illusory policy that cruelly hit the reality and 
destroyed the magic of a continue increasing of investors and homebuyers number, in 
a sort of housing perpetuum-mobile, beyond any idea of risk in future credits; this 
approach was also sustained by those policy makers thinking that subsidized credit 
could permanently achieve success based on permanent increase of houses size, 
prices ownerships number. 
When we started to prepare this paper, America's Dow Jones stock market index had 
officially taken a “correction” position - defined as a fall of more than ten percent fall 
from a previous peak. More ominously, American house prices are more than eight 
percent below their peak, and are currently falling at a rate that exceeds one percent 
per month - an unprecedented rate of decline.  
By 1998, Australian house prices exceeded the peak set in 1989, and in late 2000 the 
bubble clearly accelerated (the impact of the decisions to double the First Home 
Buyers Grant and halve the rate of capital gains tax in 2004 also stick out like the 
proverbial sore thumb). Though our bubbles appear less extreme than those in the 
USA; this is true of shares - even though by 2005 they exceeded the levels of 
overvaluation that applied in 1987 - but not of housing, where our bubble is in fact 
substantially bigger than the USA's (see Nigel Stapledon's research into long term 
housing prices in Australia). Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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Figure 2 
Australia's Asset Bubbles 
 
 
The proximate cause of this shakeout in American asset markets is the so-called 
“subprime lending crisis”. Professional opinions differ on how long this crisis will last 
and how serious its consequences will be, but the minimum expectation is that a 
recession as colloquially defined (two quarters or more of negative growth) will result. 
Two different indicators warning the trouble are CPI-deflated value of asset prices, and 
the ratio of private debt to GDP.   The debt to GDP ratio has reached a level that far 
exceeds anything ever seen before in Australia's economic history - including during 
the booms that preceded the Great Depressions of the 1890s and 1930s.  
In this paper we suggest that the consequences could be much more severe. The 
basis of our pessimism is a closer look at the broader phenomenon of which the 
subprime crisis is merely the latest instalment: a multi-decade trend for private debt to 
rise faster than income. 
Research by Australia's central bank, the Reserve Bank of Australia (Battellino 2007), 
indicates that over the three decades from 1977 to 2007, private debt (the sum of 
business and household debt) has risen faster than nominal GDP in 15 of the major 
OECD nations (the only significant exception is France).  
On this gauge, the US debt phenomenon no longer appears especially remarkable. 
Though the USA's ratio of private debt to GDP more than doubled over those three 
decades, this increase was at the low end of the international scale, which ranged from 
a maximum of an elevenfold increase for the Netherlands to a doubling for Germany 
(Japan is a special case, which we discuss later). The median experience has been 
that of Australia, whose private debt to GDP ratio has raised threefold in the last 30  Romania in a Post-Credit Crunch World?  
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years - and sixfold since the mid-1960s. The rise in private indebtedness is therefore a 
global phenomenon - which we argue is unsustainable, and must at some point 
reverse. When it does, the economic circumstances will be very different to those that 
have applied for the past three decades. We will pass from a debt-driven economy to 
one dominated by a “credit crunch”.  
 
Figure 3 
OECD Credit and Nominal GDP 
 
From the mid-60s till 2008: the debt-driven economy 
The growth in debt illustrated by the above charts has a profound impact upon 
economic performance that is neglected by conventional economic analysis, which 
ignores the role of monetary factors in economics. 
Aggregate demand in an economy for everything from commodities to assets - 
technically, Gross National Expenditure - is the sum of income and the change in debt. Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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Figure 4 
USA and Australian Debt to GDP Ratios 
 
 
When debt levels are low compared to GDP, the contribution from change in debt is 
negligible, and this monetary side of the economy can comfortably be ignored. But 
when debt levels become large compared to GDP, much of the effective demand - and 
the majority of the volatility in economic performance - is driven by changes in debt. 
Monetary factors are no longer economically irrelevant. Australia's recent economic 
history clearly illustrates this shift from an economy where monetary factors can be 
ignored, to one where they are dominant. 
As noted above, Australia's debt to GDP history is closer to the mean for all OECD 
countries than that of the USA. Also, even though Australia's economy is currently 
performing well, while America's is now feared to be in recession after the collapse of 
the subprime market, Australia's economic history also provides a clearer example 
than America of a speculation-dominated economy. 
In the 1950s and early 1960s, when Australia's private debt was less than 25% of 
GDP, annual changes in debt contributed less than 5 percent to Gross National 
Expenditure. That changed markedly in 1973, when the first and smallest of three 
recent "super-bubbles" in debt occurred (see Figure 3). Briefly, the change in debt that 
year accounted for 10 percent of nominal GNE (see Figure 4) simultaneously, the great 
1970s inflationary surge began, and unemployment in Australia exploded from its 
previous historic level of below two percent, to over six percent. Most economists 
blamed the downturn on poor government economic policy and inflation, but the real 
cause was the collapse in speculative bubble that the growth in debt had financed. 
With the bubble over, speculators shifted from willingly taking on debt, to trying 
desperately to reduce it. The rate of growth of debt fell well below the rate of inflation,  Romania in a Post-Credit Crunch World?  
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and the change in debt went from boosting real aggregate demand to subtracting from 
it. The Australian economy went into its first post-WWII recession - caused by a 
decrease in the rate of growth of private debt. 
Figure 5 
Australia's Economic Dependence on Expanding Debt 
 
 
The dependence on debt became even more extreme as debt rose from 44% of GDP 
in 1973 to 85% in 1990, during the next debt super-bubble. At the peak of that bubble, 
increases in private debt accounted for almost 14% of aggregate demand. This was a 
huge credit-driven boost to the economy while it lasted, but when it went into reverse 
the change in debt turned negative and reductions in debt reduced nominal GNE by 
almost 1.5 percent. Real GNE fell by substantially more, since inflation dropped along 
with the fall in debt. The economy entered into its deepest post-WWII recession yet, 
with unemployment exceeding 11 percent.  
We face the dilemma that with high debt levels, economic performance becomes 
dependent on the further accumulation of debt. When debt is small or changing by only 
small amounts, most variation in economic performance is due to real productive 
factors. But when debt is much larger than output, changes in debt contribute 
disproportionately to changes in apparent economic performance. Ironically, 
superficially good economic performance - such as falling unemployment--becomes 
dependent on ultimately unsustainable further increases in debt. 
This is apparent in the correlation between unemployment and change in debt in the 
Australian data. In the 1950s and 1960s, when debt was under 25% of GDP, changes 
in debt made a comparatively small contribution to changes in effective demand, and 
hence the correlation between changes in debt and changes in unemployment was 
small (and positive). Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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Figure 6 
Australian Change in Debt and Unemployment 
 
 
However, as debt rose relative to GDP, changes in debt made a much larger 
contribution to changes in effective demand, and hence to changes in unemployment. 
The correlation between changes in debt and changes in unemployment consequently 
increased in magnitude as debt accumulated over time. Now, that  
Figure 7 
American Change in Debt and Unemployment  
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correlation has stabilized at more than 90 percent - which means that a decline in the 
rate of growth of debt is highly likely to be correlated with an increase in the level of 
unemployment (see Figures 5-6). 
A similar observation applies to the American economy (see Figures 7-8). The 
correlation of changes in private debt with unemployment is more volatile than in the 
Australian case - in part because of the comparatively massive contributions from 
changes in government and financial sector debt to American demand. But clearly the 
Australian and American economies, in concert with 13 other major OECD nations, 
have become "addicted to debt". 
Figure 8 
Growing Correlation of Change in Debt and Unemployment as Debt Rises 
 
 
This is the most conventionally economic danger facing the world economy as the US 
subprime crisis spreads. As households go from willingly taking on more debt to trying 
to reduce their indebtedness, the change in debt will go from boosting aggregate 
demand to subtracting from it.  The 1990s collapse in debt levels caused 
unemployment in Australia to rise from six to eleven percent - yet in 1990, the change 
in debt was responsible for "only" 14 percent of GNE. Today, it accounts for over 18 
percent of GNE.  
 Similarly in the USA, when the debt-driven component of nominal GNE dropped from 
10 to 2 percent across the 1990s recession, unemployment rose from 5 to almost 8 
percent. Today, increasing debt accounts for 14 percent of US GNE - and the 
subprime crisis clearly marks the end of this latest and biggest debt bubble. The 
macroeconomic impact of the switch from expanding to contracting debt levels is likely 
to result in the deepest recession in the USA's post-WWII economic history. Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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Since so much of the OECD is in a similar debt-driven state to America, the turnaround 
in debt that is occurring there is likely to be replicated across much of the OECD. It is 
therefore highly likely that at least an OECD-wide recession will occur, if not a global 
recession. If so, this will be the first time in Romania's post-Revolution economic 
history that external economic conditions have been contractionary rather than 
expansionary. What are the implications of this for Romania itself? 
Obviously this depends to some extent on the level of indebtedness in Romania. 
According to OECD database (http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/Default.aspx?usercontext 
=sourceoecd), where annual data to 2006 implies that Romania's aggregate debt to 
GDP ratio is even worse than that for the USA, both in terms of magnitude and its rate 
of increase. This suggests that Romania could face a debt-driven downturn in 
aggregate demand when the rate of change of debt falls, in addition to a diminution in 
export demand. According to the central bank 2007 report the composition of the 
external debt by debtor illustrates, in a year by year comparison, on both medium and 
long term, the prevalence of non-guaranteed public debt (64.3 percent), followed with 
29.2% by direct public debt (guaranteed public debt - 8.2 %), and deposits - 8.5 % 
representing a wider nonguaranteed public debt by 6.2 %, whereas the weights of 
direct public debt and guaranteed public debt narrowed by 6.4 percentage points and 
4.9 percentage points respectively. As regarding the aggregate monetary balance of 
credit institutions data, in 2007, non-government credit increased at a faster step 
compared to the previous year (nominal 60.2 % versus real 50.3 % compared to 54.5 
% and 47.3 %).  
Figure 9 
Australia's Long Term Debt to GDP History: Three Debt Bubbles 
 
Structural analysis indicates that the rise in loans to households was the driver of credit 
expansion. The share of loans to households increased to 48.1 percent at end-2007  Romania in a Post-Credit Crunch World?  
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from 42.5 percent a year earlier, thereby pushing non-government credit up by around 
62.5 percent, posting a much faster growth rate (82.1 percent in nominal terms; 70.9 
percent in real terms) than loans to NFIs (46.8 percent in nominal terms; 37,7 percent 
in real terms). As expected, in absolute terms, consumer loans held the largest share 
in 2007. 
Long-term Australian economic data implies that this will be no ordinary recession. 
Australia's Reserve Bank assembled a long term data series on the debt to GDP ratio, 
which shows that Australia's economic performance since 1965 has been driven by a 
debt bubble which is the third and by far the biggest in its economic history. 
Figure 10 
Debt in Romania and the USA 
 
 
It is likely that the same applies to the USA: that today's private debt levels are the 
largest in the history of capitalism, and that what we are experiencing now is a repeat 
of the processes that gave rise to earlier financial panics. 
As Mark Twain famously remarked, "History doesn't repeat, but it sure does rhyme", 
and Australia's economic history gives strong reason to expect something far more 
severe than a mere recession. The bursting of Australia's two previous historic debt 
bubbles - in 1892 and 1931 -ushered in not merely recessions, but Depressions (long-
term data on real GDP growth, money supply change and inflation implies that the USA 
also experienced a Depression in the 1890s - see Keen 2008A). Yet the debt levels 
then were substantially less than today's. It appears that the existence of Central 
Banks that, as in the case of the US's Federal Reserve, respond to financial crises by 
trying to "save the private sector from itself", may actually have contributed to a "moral 
hazard" dilemma that has allowed debt levels to exceed previous bounds. Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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If history is any guide, then without Central Bank activism - such as the rescue of Long-
Term Capital Management, and the aggressive cutting of reserve rates during the 
1990s recession - it is likely that the 1990s bubble would have marked the peak of 
private debt accumulation (at 125 percent of GDP for the USA, and 85 percent for 
Australia). That in itself would have been bad enough, given the historical record - 
given the aftermaths of the previous two bubbles. But with today's debt levels, we truly 
are in unprecedented territory. 
We are not saying that a global Depression is inevitable, because there are other 
aspect of the modern economic and social system that differs substantially to that of 
1930 and 1890. Bank collapses and the destruction of depositors’ savings, which were 
a feature of the 1890s in Australia (and the 1930s in America), will not recur; and 
government social security payments during a downturn will provide  households with 
cash flows that can be used to service debt, something that did not happen in 1930. 
Given this philosophy, sound economic management has come to be seen as requiring 
a reduction in government interference in market processes, and the enhancement of 
competition, while Central Banks have interpreted their monetary policy responsibility 
as being limited to controlling the rate of inflation via movements in the short term rate 
of interest. 
But there will inevitably be an extended period of reduced vitality to aggregate demand, 
as income is channelled to pay debt levels down from today's unprecedented levels to 
something closer to the 20-60 percent of GDP level that appears sustainable in the 
long run. In Australia and America's cases, such a reduction in private debt would 
require more than an entire year's GDP to be directed simply at debt reduction. Since 
that cannot be done in one hit, this implies a long period where demand will grow more 
slowly than capacity to produce output rises. 
 
The Ponzi Credit Dynamic 
The Australian long-term data indicate that there is something systemic in Western 
economies that lead to periodic debt explosions, and subsequent serious debt-driven 
downturns. The most cogent theory to explain this phenomenon is the "Financial 
Instability Hypothesis", which was developed by the American economist Hyman 
Minsky in the late 1950s and early 1960s (see Keen 1995, 2008B). A key aspect of 
Minsky's model was the existence of "Ponzi financing", in which individual speculators 
use borrowed money to buy assets, and then attempt to profit by selling them to other 
speculators for a higher price.
1 
This behavior is dependent on asset prices rising faster than commodity prices, and 
requires that debt rise faster still—and this has clearly been the case in most OECD 
economies in the last 3 decades. This in turn requires a financial system that willingly 
generates debt, up to a point at which the debt burden causes a crisis that suddenly 
stems the flow of credit - a "credit crunch". 
                                                           
1 With very little irony, subprime lending can be summarized as a scheme to make money by 
lending money to people who couldn't afford to repay it. It is thus a classic “Ponzi Scheme”, and 
the wonder is not that it collapsed, but that anyone could take the Scheme seriously when it 
was first mooted.  Romania in a Post-Credit Crunch World?  
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Conventional models of money creation - which argue that the banking system does no 
more than amplify the monetary creation processes of the Central Bank - cannot 
explain this process, and in any case fail to account for the empirical data which show 
that credit money creation actually precedes the creation of Central Bank money by up 
to one year (Kydland and Prescott, 1990). A far more cogent explanation is given by 
the Circuitist School model of endogenous money creation (Graziani 1989, 2004). 
Recently one of us (Keen, 2007) has developed a mathematical model of this process 
in a pure credit economy. 
The model explains how money is endogenously created, why banks are motivated to 
extend credit indefinitely, and what happens to aggregate demand when a credit 
crunch occurs. It is easily developed from a "double-entry book-keeping" table of the 
flows between accounts that are initiated by a loan from a bank to a firm to finance 
production. 
The model is developed in more detail in Keen, 2008C (see also Chapman & Keen, 
2006). Here we will stick with a simpler presentation for the sake of exposition. A bank 
loan to a firm creates two accounts: a record of debt FL, and a deposit account for the 
firm FD. An initial loan thus instantly creates a matching deposit, and also sets up 
interest payment obligations between the bank and the firm: the firm is obliged to pay 
interest on the outstanding debt, while the bank is obliged to pay interest on the current 
level of the firm's deposit account (the rates differ of course, with the rate of interest on 
loans rL exceeding that on deposits rD.). The funds flow between the firm's and the 
bank's deposit accounts, as shown in the first row of Table One. 
 
Table 1  
A model of endogenous money creation 
Assets Liabilities  Account 
Type  Loans Reserves Sum  Deposits 
Sum 
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Once the firm has money it its deposit account, it can hire workers to produce output. 
The flow of wages from firms to workers goes into the workers deposit account WD; 
this is the second row in the table. 
Workers therefore have positive bank balances, and they too receive interest on these 
balances from the bank; this is the third row in the table. 
Workers and bankers then buy commodities from the firm, resulting in expenditure 
flows from the BD and WD accounts to the firm's deposit account FD: this is the fourth 
row in the table. The arguments β and ω represent the rates of flow per annum out of 
each account, relative to the balances at any time. 
The next row in the table explains how money is endogenously created. In the real 
world, firms negotiate lines of credit with banks, which enable them to undertake 
expenditures - and thus effectively create money in the accounts of other firms - which 
the banks record as a matching increase in their outstanding debt levels. In the 
aggregate, this result in a simultaneous increase in Firms’ deposits and firms’ recorded 
debt levels. Unlike the previous rows in the table, this results in a net increase in both 
bank liabilities - the sum of outstanding bank deposits - and bank assets. The 
argument nM represents the rate at which the money supply expands each year. 
The next two rows record loan repayment flows from firms to banks, and the flow of 
bank reserves from banks to firms - effectively, the "recycling" of loans that have 
previously been repaid. Both these transaction flows involve transfers from the liability 
to the asset side of the bank's ledger, but on the asset side itself they simply result in 
the form of assets changing: from loans (which generate an income flow to the bank) to 
reserves (which, being inactive, do not generate an income flow to the bank). The 
arguments RL and LR represent the annual rate of loan repayment and the annual rate 
of reserve recycling per annum, respectively. 
We can now derive a dynamic model of endogenous money creation simply by adding 
up the columns in the above table. Each column represents the flows into and out of a 
given account. We thus have the following set of coupled differential equations 
describing the basic dynamics of money creation in a pure credit economy: 
 
Equation 1: A Coupled Differential Equation Model of Endogenous Money 
LM DL DR R
RL D R R
D DD LL D D D MD LD RR
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The model can now be used to explain why banks are predisposed to generate as 
much credit as borrowers are willing to absorb up until a debt crisis occurs, and also to 
show what happens when the system shifts from expanding credit to a credit crunch. 
On the first issue, bank income rises if the rate of money creation nM and the rate of 
loan recycling LR rise, while it falls if the rate of loan repayment RL rises. Banks 
therefore have a vested interest in increasing the rate of money creation, increasing 
the rate of recirculation of their reserves, and discouraging borrowers from repaying 
loans. 
Of course, as current economic conditions are now reminding us, this state of affairs 
does not persist when loan defaults grow, and banks become concerned that lending 
more money will lead not to more profits, but to capital losses. The shift in sentiment 
we can now see in the USA, from profligate lending to a credit crunch, involves a 
reversal in the above three key parameters: banks reduce the rate at which they create 
new money, the recirculation of existing reserves slows, and borrowers try to reduce 
their indebtedness.  
Figure 11 
Deposits Before & After a Credit Crunch 
 
Figures 10 and 11 show this process with a doubling of the rate at which borrowers 
attempt to repay loans, and a halving of both the rate of recirculation of existing loans 
and of the rate of creation of new money.
2 The effect is a precipitous drop in money in 
circulation - which necessarily reduces the rate of economic activity. 
                                                           
2  The initial loan value is $100, and parameter values before the credit crunch are: rL=5%; 
rD=3%; β=1; ω=26; nM=10% RL=2; and LR=2. Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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Bank assets, nonetheless, continue to grow (though extending the model to include 
bankruptcy would change this detail), but there is a dramatic shift from active assets 
(loans) to inactive ones (reserves). 
The system does stabilize and return to growth after a relatively short period, but this is 
at a dramatically lower level of both active money and economic activity. 
Figure 12 
Bank Assets Before and After a Credit Crunch 
 
Clearly, a process like this is currently underway in the USA, and given the 
interconnectedness of the world financial system and the extent to which the rest of the 
OECD is also debt-encumbered, it is only a matter of time before the same process 
manifests itself worldwide. There will be attenuating effects from countries which are 
net global creditors - such as China and Japan - or which have not indulged in the orgy 
of Ponzi financing (such as France), but these are unlikely to be sufficient to counter 
the negative impact of both the credit crunch, and the macroeconomic impact of debt 
reduction on aggregate demand. 
Romania, having only just completed the transition from a socialist to a market 
economy, may therefore have to prepare itself for yet another economic shock as the 
global capitalist system becomes mired in a debt trap. We can have some modern 
guidance as to what this might mean for the economy from the experience of Japan, 
which as noted earlier, is an important exception to the general debt to GDP rule 
indicated in Figure Two. 
This is because though, from the graph, Japan has the lowest rate of growth of debt 
relative to GDP, this is only because Japan entered a debt-deflation seventeen years 
ago, when its Bubble Economy collapsed at the end of the 1980s. Japan's private debt 
to GDP ratio has fallen substantially since 1990 - though the OECD Stat figures are not  Romania in a Post-Credit Crunch World?  
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directly comparable to the Australian and US data used above, they still imply a more 
than 20 percent fall in the ratio since its peak. But this has been bought at the cost of a 
seriously depressed economy, as shown by the OECD's Composite Leading Indicators 
(CLI), which indicate current living standards and allow cross-country comparisons to 
be made. 
Whereas Japan was far ahead of the USA on the CLI scale in 1990, when the Bubble 
Economy collapsed, Japan's economic performance stalled - and by 2004, American 
living standards had moved ahead of Japan's. Japanese living standards today are no 
better than they were a decade earlier - whereas previously, living standards improved 
by up to 50 percent every decade. There are doubtless other factors that have 
contributed to this stagnation, but the debt crisis of the early 1990s and its long-running 
aftermath are key to understanding why, in 1990, the sun stopped rising in the land of 
the rising sun. 
When Japan's crisis occurred, many Western economists blamed it on the lack of 
transparency of the Western (and in particular, American) financial system, and argued 
that Japan's crisis simply couldn't occur in the West, because of its higher financial 
standards and superior financial innovation. Today's crisis may show that this was 
simply American hubris: Japan's 1990s crisis was caused by a speculative bubble 
focused on real estate, and America has clearly followed suit in the subsequent 
decades. 
 
No way to run an economy 
Though a market economy is clearly preferable to a centrally planned one from 
Romania's own experience, there is something somewhat insane in a system that 
allows itself to be periodically despoiled by pointless speculation on housing, and 
excessive debt accumulation. Is this phenomenon something that one must accept as 
inevitably a part of a capitalist system, or is there something that could be done to stop, 
or at least attenuate, this process in the future? 
There are ways in which some financial instability in capitalism is inevitable. As Minsky 
once remarked, "stability is destabilizing", because a period of tranquil growth leads 
investors to revise their risk expectations, thus leading to accelerating growth and the 
accumulation of debt. 
However, much of the long-term run-up in debt has nothing to do with actual 
investment, but instead involves pure speculation on asset prices. This, in turn, is 
possible because, when an asset bubble takes hold, when a disconnection develops 
between asset prices and the income flows those assets generate: share prices rise 
much faster than corporate earnings, while house prices rise faster than the rents. We 
need some means to attenuate the willingness of banks to fund speculation on shares 
and houses when such bubbles arise. 
One possible means with housing would be to limit the security that a lender can get 
over a house to the income that the house itself can be expected to generate. 
 Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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Figure 13 
Before and After Japan's Bubble Economy 
 
 
At present, if a borrower defaults on a mortgage, then the lender gets ownership of the 
house, and can sell it for whatever it can fetch on the market. However, it would be 
possible to reform lending laws so that the financial limit of the security the lender 
received was some sensible multiple of the (actual or imputed) rental income from the 
property. Lenders would still be able to lend as much as they wished to a borrower, but 
would share some of the risk if he overextended himself. It is feasible that this sharing 
of risk could reduce the "moral hazard" that the current system generates, and thereby 
reduce the supply of credit to fund real estate speculation. 
Central Banks around the world have largely taken the position that asset price 
bubbles are not their concern, or that they can't do anything to control them in any 
event. But the link between asset price bubbles and financial crises should be obvious 
to all now. Ignoring asset bubbles is clearly not good monetary policy. Because they 
did not consider indicators like the ones shown above, Central Banks, the supposed 
watchdogs of our financial system, were caught unawares when the current crisis 
began. 
While this is not as radical a change as the move from a socialist to a capitalist 
economy that Romania has already undertaken, such changes tend to be very hard to 
achieve in a capitalist economy because of the political power of lenders, and the many 
vested interests in real estate. However surely such a change is worth contemplating if 
the alternative is a fiasco like the USA's current subprime crisis, and an extended 
Depression like that which still dominates Japan today. 
Essentially, the idea of "a new financial order that includes new monetary units that 
(will help) wipe clean the world's debt ledgers." At best, it will be a tough sell given that 
the US, by far, is the world's largest debtor and the one most in need of help. The  Romania in a Post-Credit Crunch World?  
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urgency for all others is that if America sinks, it'll drag down all world economies with it, 
so it's possible some kind of solution will be arranged. But it's not assured, nor can it be 
ruled out that the summit will be stalemated as every nation has its own concerns and 
its own constituency to serve.  
More and more people have started to take into account suggestions as Edelson’s that 
world economy will finally manage an “universal currency devaluation" without 
confiscating gold. They don't have to and instead can "raise the current official central 
bank price from its booked ($42.22) value an ounce - to a price that monetizes a large 
enough portion of the world's outstanding debts."  
If this happens, debts will be reduced to a fraction of re-inflated asset prices "led higher 
by the gold price."  Edelson also believes that in place of the dollar as a reserve 
currency, "three new monetary units of exchange (will emerge) with equal reserve 
status" - a new dollar, euro and "a new pan-Asian currency" with the Chinese yuan 
likely surviving and linked to a basket of the other three.  
With devaluation, the new currencies, under new names, will be worth less than the old 
ones. New "regulations and programs would be designed and implemented to ease the 
transition to a new monetary system" - if it happens and it's by no means assured.  
 
Different points of view:  Experts and Politicians 
There is little evidence that politicians would have done any better in preventing the 
speculative bubbles in Australia, the USA, or the European countries. However, the 
great difference between having politicians and independent Central Banks setting 
monetary policy is that former group is at least accountable for its mistakes via the 
political process, whereas the latter is not. Given that future economic policy may be 
dominated by trying to clean up the mess left by this bubble, now is not the time to be 
making the policy makers even less accountable to the public. 
The non-monetary factors may become the main drivers of inflation. Had these truly 
Millennial factors not been present, the Australian and global economies would now be 
on the verge not of stagflation, but of deflation. This could still yet occur, if the 
economic downturn caused by the Subprime Crisis and the ensuing Credit Crunch 
turns out to be very severe. In that eventuality, the last thing we need is a monetary 
policy that has a deflationary bias. A glance at the record of the 1930s in the USA 
shows why. When the “Great Crash” occurred in October 1929, America's inflation ratio 
was barely positive, and the debt to GDP ratio was 150 percent. The debt ratio then 
exploded to 215 percent by 1932, driven not by further borrowing, but by a collapse in 
both real output and prices. Deflation, with prices falling by as much as ten percent per 
annum for four years, played a major role in making that Depression the worst in 
recorded history. Therefore it is strongly recommended to take firm act and stimulate 
economies by providing liquidity, strengthening the capital flow in a sound 
management, protecting savings and deposits, act against any deficiencies, all at one 
to keep the credit market warm and flexible. The international financial institutions have 
to provide the right and accurate support where required. This will help in sustaining 
the financial stability and allowing the economies grow. Some of the emerging 
economies like Romania are still experiencing official growth but increasingly are being Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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adversely impacted by the worldwide slowdown. To avoid misinterpretation of data and 
situations it is also recommended to strengthening financial transparency that ensures 
the accountability accuracy and avoids excessive risk-taking. Only promoting 
prudential oversight, integrity in assuming the risk management, is possible to protect 
the integrity of the world's financial markets, to avoid conflicts of interest, to prevent 
illegal activities and market manipulation transformed into abuses. Identifying, in real 
time, the market vulnerabilities is the single way to anticipate the potential stress and 
play the right role for a sound economic development. 
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Data Sources 





Dow Jones Industrial Average, http://finance.yahoo.com 
Japanese data, http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/getujidb/index.htm; 
http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/chouki/index.htm 
Romanian National Bank: www.bnr.ro 
OECD Composite Leading Indicators, 
http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/Default.aspx?usercontext=sourceoecd 
US Debt Data, Federal Reserve Board, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/data.htm 